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Abstract 
The impact of induced technological change (ITC) in energy/climate models on the timing of 
optimal CO2-abatement depends on whether R&D or learning-by-doing (LBD) is the driving 
force. Bottom-up energy system models employing LBD suggest strong increases in optimal 
early abatement. In this paper we extend an existing top-down model supporting this view 
according to the notion that socio-economic inertia interferes with rapid technological change. 
We derive analytical results concerning the impact of inertia and ITC on optimal initial 
abatement and show a wide range of numerical simulations to illustrate magnitudes. Inertia now 
dominates the timing decision on early abatement, such that LBD might even have a negative 
effect on early abatement and the impact of R&D is limited. However, ITC still reduces costs of 
stabilizing atmospheric CO2-concentrations considerably. 
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1. Introduction 
Scenarios of energy use and CO2-emissions as well as the costs of limiting climate change 
depend crucially on technological change. Many (older) energy/climate models assume 
exogenous technological progress, usually called autonomous energy efficiency improvements 
(AEEI). Results are very sensitive to the AEEI. Modelers have been well aware that energy 
technology does not fall "like manna from heaven", but rather results from R&D or learning-by-
doing (LBD). Therefore, researchers have implemented methodological advancements of new 
growth theory into energy/climate models. Endogenizing technological change has significant 
effects on the cost of stabilizing atmospheric CO2-concentration and on the optimal timing of 
abatement efforts. Since we can accelerate technological change, the option to induce 
technological change provides more degrees of freedom in decision-making. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the majority of models reveals drastic reductions in compliance costs, particularly 
in case of LBD, as learning is basically for free (Azar and Dowlatabadi, 1999; Grubb et al., 
2002; Löschel, 2002). Most LBD models suggest increased near term abatement to realize 
learning potentials (Rasmussen (2001), and Manne and Richels (2004) are exceptions
1). More 
diverse results can be found in the case of R&D. Goulder and Schneider (1999) show that the 
impact of R&D on total abatement costs depends on assumptions about potential crowding out 
and spillovers between environmental and non-environmental R&D (similarly Popp (2004)). 
Furthermore, including R&D seems to have a rather negligible effect on optimal timing 
decisions. 
 
Most models with induced technological change (ITC) are rather complex and lack analytical 
tractability. Goulder and Mathai (2000) – from here on referred to as GM – use an analytical 
model, which also allows for comparing R&D and LBD. They show that induced technological 
change necessarily reduces total costs of stabilizing the atmosphere at any given level. Moreover, 
initial abatement is always lower with R&D than without. On the other hand, the effect of LBD 
on initial abatement is ambiguous in theory, although a wide range of numerical simulations 
show that LBD has a strong increasing effect on early abatement. 
                                                 
1  Rasmussen (2001) reports a slight negative impact of LBD on optimal near term abatement in a multi sector 
model. LBD cost reductions only occur in the renewable energy sector and follow a knowledge accumulation 
function similar to the one used in the model to be presented here. Manne and Richels (2004) implement LBD in 
the bottom-up energy system model MERGE. They basically find no impact of LBD on the optimal path but 
major cost reductions.   2
 
This paper demonstrates that GM’s results on the optimal timing of abatement are biased by their 
assumption that there is no inertia in the energy system. GM neglect that there are barriers that 
slow the diffusion of new energy technologies. Sathaye et al. (2001) identify missing markets, 
distorted prices, financial market imperfections, tariffs on imported equipment preventing 
international diffusion, transaction costs, distorted incentives, public goods nature of 
information, but also social, cultural, and behavioral norms and aspirations as the main barriers.
2 
However, these barriers are difficult to quantify and modeling them would overload the analytic 
framework of the GM model, which requires perfect market assumptions. But GM also ignore 
that energy consumption is partly determined by the capital stock, which turns over only slowly. 
Figure 1 shows the typical turnover times for energy producing and consuming equipment. On 
the lower end, refrigerators and cars run for at least ten years, whereas energy generating and 
distributing infrastructure lies in a range of 30 to 50 years. Moreover, the building stock and 
transport patterns are likely to remain unchanged for decades if not centuries.
3 Thus, significant 
emission reductions in a short time imply expensive premature capital turnover costs. Taking 
into consideration the other barriers to diffusion, the use of turnover costs seems to be a 
conservative estimate of the costs of socio-economic inertia. 
 
In order to keep the analytical lucidness of GM’s model, inertia is included in the simplest way, 
i.e. by penalizing rapid changes in the level of abatement from one period to the next (Ha-Duong 
et al., 1997). GM identify that major gains from ITC result from the option to accelerate 
abatement efforts when they have become cheaper due to previous R&D or LBD. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to assume that inertia might offset some of the gains from ITC. However, we show 
here that the cost reducing effect of ITC in GM's model is robust to the inclusion of inertia. 
Furthermore, numerical simulations demonstrate that even an inert path can show considerable 
acceleration of emission reduction. This is mainly caused by discounting. 
 
Ha-Duong et al. (1997) observe an upward shift of optimal initial abatement efforts due to 
inertia. Their study neglects LBD but they hypothesize that a model incorporating both inertia 
and LBD would call for even higher early abatement. Already GM's analytical model cannot 
prove them unambiguously right. But inertia even aggravates ambiguity, so that in contrast to 
                                                 
2  See also Jaffe et al. (2002). 
3  Similar time spans are reported by Hammitt et al. (1992) and Grubb (1997).   3
GM's numerical simulations and the large majority of LBD studies to date, the model presented 
here shows a small, perhaps even negative influence of LBD on early abatement. This can be 
explained by the notion that inertia shifts initial abatement significantly upward, so that 
decreasing returns from LBD prevent additional gains from more pronounced early actions. The 
paper further shows that ITC reduces the costs of stabilizing atmospheric CO2-concentrations, 
but also that its effects on optimal timing have been overstated. Inertia seems to be a much more 
important determinant of the optimal abatement path than is ITC. 
 
 We restrict our analysis to the stabilization of CO2-concentrations at a given target. GM also 
explore a cost-benefit setting with a damage function relating CO2-concentration levels to 
economic costs. In such a setting one could measure the impact of inertia on the optimal target, 
which equals marginal costs and benefits. As inertia adds to abatement costs, higher inertia 
would therefore imply a less strict target. However, inherent in a cost-benefit approach of climate 
change is the problem that (high) current abatement costs are weighted against future benefits 
from avoided climate change, which are discounted over several decades. Consequently, as can 
also be observed in GM’s model, less initial abatement is justified and the optimal atmospheric 
CO2-concentration is rather high. In such a framework, costs to overcome inertia as part of the 
total abatement costs are expected to have only a minor impact on optimal abatement.
4 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, a simple analytical model of ITC via LBD 
or R&D and inertia is introduced and analyzed particularly with respect to the behavior of 
optimal initial abatement. Section 3 describes the functional forms and parameter values chosen 
for numerical simulations, before Section 4 is devoted to the extensive presentation of results, 
including sensitivity analyses. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and discusses the main insights. 
2. The  model 
The main assumptions and the structure underlying the treatment of technological change follow 
GM, whereas inertia is modeled as in Ha-Duong et al. (1997). The model can be considered as 
                                                 
4   In a cost-benefit framework as in GM, the discount rate and the assumed damage function are the main 
determinants of optimal abatement. Restricting ourselves to a stabilization target approach avoids the issue of 
discounting future benefits, which implies strong ethical assumptions (see e.g. Tol, 1999). There is much wider 
agreement that discounting is appropriate for abatement costs, and that discount rates should reflect the (social) 
opportunity costs of capital (Markandya et al., 2001). Applying different discounting schemes is deferred to future 
research.   4
“top-down” given the implicit postulation that the world economy is at its optimum at first, i.e. 
any no-regret options due to market failures or non-optimizing behavior are completely 
exhausted. Now the economy faces a new constraint, namely to stabilize atmospheric CO2-
concentrations at a certain level at a certain point in time. Technological change enters the model 
either through R&D or through LBD, such that there are actually two different models, which 
use a common overall structure so as to allow for comparisons between both specifications. The 
following subsection describes the abatement cost function used in either mode, before the R&D 
and the LBD specifications are explored separately. 
2.1.  The abatement cost function 
Following basically GM’s notation, C
A(At, Ht, 
0
t E ) is the aggregate abatement cost function of a 
competitive economy, in which producers minimize costs. The superscript A indicates that costs 
refer to the direct level of abatement, compared to the costs of change that are described down 
below.  At denotes the level of abatement at time t,  Ht refers to the level of technology (or 
knowledge), and 
0
t E  are the baseline emissions allowing the cost function to depend on the 
relative rather than the absolute level of abatement.
5 The function is assumed to have increasing 
marginal abatement costs (
A
A C> 0  and 
A
AA > C ). Technology is supposed to reduce costs 






C ). Finally, abatement 
becomes less costly the more there is to abate, thus giving  and 
0
A
E C< AE C< 0 . 
 
The costs of change are considered to be C
R (Rt), where Rt is a variable reflecting the speed of 
change in abatement and is related to the difference between current and previous abatement, i.e. 
Rt might become negative. Since transition costs are likely to increase also at an increasing rate, 
this requires
R
R > 0 C and
R
RR> C . The rather unpleasant notation of the absolute values of R 
takes care of the fact that not only rapid switches from low to high levels of abatement are 
expensive, but also rapid switches back, i.e. once our cars are running on hydrogen, it would be 
costly to move to carbon fuels again. For analytical simplicity, the absolute values will be 
replaced below by squares of R
0
                                                
t. The transition costs are assumed to be independent of the level 
 
5 Since baseline emissions are given, one could also provide the cost function with a time index and abandon
0
t E as 
an argument of the function.   5
of technology, because they reflect the costs of significantly speeding up installation of 
abatement technology, i.e. replacing equipment at a higher rate than depreciation. Installation 
costs themselves are included in the direct abatement costs C
A and are therefore subject to 
technological change. Following Ha-Duong et al. (1997) we assume that direct abatement costs 
and change costs are separable, i.e. total abatement costs are 
. This formulation allows for restrictions on the functional 
form of the change costs, without restricting the direct cost function as well; this improves 
analytical tractability.
tot 0 A R





A,  I 0




S= - δ 
H= α 
0 R =0
0 R =0 
2.2.  Technological change through R&D 
In the R&D formulation of the model the social planner has to choose an optimal abatement path 
together with optimal investments in R&D to accumulate knowledge. Adding the corresponding 
equations of motion for knowledge as well as atmospheric CO2-concentrations and a 
concentration constraint the planner faces the following intertemporal minimization problem: 
   
0R - r t
tt t t t t  H , E )+C (R )+ p(I )I )e dt                (1) 
   s . t .   R=  for t ≥ 1                   (2)  tt t t R+ A-A - 1
t
t
                          (3) 
0
tt t S+ E -A
                        (4)  tt t H+ k Ψ(I ,H )
                            (5a) 
                            (5b) 
H0, S0 given and t SS ≤  for t ≥ T,                 (6) 
where It is investment into R&D, p(It) is the real price of a unit of research, r is the discount rate, 
St is atmospheric CO2-concentration,  δ is the natural rate of CO2 uptake, α is the rate of 
autonomous technological change, Ψ(•) is the knowledge accumulation function, k is a parameter 
that defines the magnitude of ITC and S  is the stabilization target to be met from year T 
onwards. 
                                                 
6  As we add costs of change to a (top-down) abatement costs function, we cannot apply this setup to analyze 
whether inertia might explain why top-down models tend to predict higher abatement costs than bottom-up 
models. After all, adding additional costs actually widens the gap even more.    6
 
Expression (1) states that the planner minimizes the discounted sum of direct abatement costs, 
costs of change and investment costs from now on to the infinite future. Expression (2) defines 
that R changes with the difference between current and previous abatement. So R can be handled 
as a state variable that depends on the control variable and a lagged control variable, and 
therefore the system is solvable as a model with delayed response following Kamien and 
Schwartz (1991, Part II, Section 19).
7 The choice of this setup requires some discussion. A more 
intuitive approach might be to set  tt A R =   with Rt as a control variable and At as a state variable. 
But this approach was dismissed for several reasons. First of all, we are interested in the optimal 
path of At rather than the change in At, especially at early time steps. But to derive the value of At 
from R would require an initialization of At, influencing results, or would require an additional 
control variable A0. More importantly, results would be more difficult to interpret, as we would 
obtain the shadow price of the change in abatement, rather than the shadow price of abatement. 
The ambiguities reported below would also appear in the alternative setup. Another advantage of 
the approach we are using is that the GM model is fully nested in it and appears for C(  
ensuring the highest possible degree of comparability. 
R
t R) = 0
 
A drawback in the formulation of equation (2) is that the change costs R enter the objective 
function lagged by one period.
8 For large time steps, this formulation is inexact. However, in this 
manner we avoid the use of lead variables and introduce the costs of change nonetheless and in a 
simple form at that. Assuming infinitesimally small time steps the formulation does not alter the 
qualitative insights gained from the analytical model. 
 
The equation of motion for S (expression 3) shows that CO2-concentration declines through 
natural removal of atmospheric CO2 and abatement, but increases through baseline emissions. 
According to expression (4) knowledge rises by the exogenous rate α plus induced knowledge 
                                                 
0
1 t
7  El-Hodiri et al. (1972) develop a growth model with lags in the employment of the optimal capital stock and Mann 
(1975) models the delay between advertising expenditures and their impact on sales. For an application of the 
technique in the context of resource economics, see Wilman and Mahendrarajah (2002). 
8
  Following the delayed response setup one gets  , where it would be more appropriate 
to have . This would get closer to the intuitive approach to set  following the setup in Grubb et 
al. (1995) as well as in Hourcade and Chapuis (1995). But both studies do not provide any analytical derivations; 
and therefore for their simulations they presumably used a similar definition of the rate as here akin to the time 
derivative. 
21 1 1 R= R- R+ A- A 01 =A-A
R= 22 R= A- A t A   7
accumulation. Ψ(•) is assumed to be positive and increasing in It with diminishing returns (ΨI(•) 
> 0, ΨII(•) < 0). Whether ΨH(•) > 0 or ΨH(•) < 0 depends on whether knowledge accumulation is 
characterized by “standing on shoulders” meaning that researchers built on successful work of 
their predecessors; or whether there might be a “fishing out” of opportunities assuming that there 
exists only a limited amount of knowledge, so that it gets more difficult to achieve additional 
knowledge the more is already exhausted. Analytically a decision on the behavior of knowledge 
accumulation with respect to H is not necessary, but it is helpful (for the later sufficiency of the 
solution) to ensure concavity by presuming ΨHH(•) < 0, which seems reasonable no matter if we 
are in a “standing on shoulders” or “fishing out” world. The relative importance of ITC 
compared to autonomous technological change is defined through k, which is used in the analysis 
as a switch to “turn on ITC” through an increase from k = 0 to k > 0, allowing for comparative 
statics. 
 
Expressions (5a) and (5b) take care of the starting point problem due to the lagged control 
variable in (2). Finally, condition (6) forces CO2-concentrations not to exceed the concentration 
target S  from period T on. 
2.2.1.  Solving the problem 
As mentioned in the previous section, the model is set up with a delayed response mechanism 
and the first order conditions are obtained, following Kamien and Schwartz (1991). As already 
indicated above, it is convenient at this point to accept some loss of generality by replacing the 
broad form of the change cost function with a quadratic function, such that 
   C
R (Rt) = mRt
2,                       (7) 
where m is a parameter that defines the magnitude of costs associated with the rate of change.
9 
Plugging (7) into (1), abandoning the superscript of the direct cost function and switching signs 
of the objective function to obtain a maximization problem leads to the current value 
Hamiltonian 
2 00
tt t t t t t t t t t t tt t t t t t =- C( A,  H ,  E )-m R -p( I ) I -τ (-δS+ E - A) + µ( αH+ k Ψ(I ,H ))+ - 1 λ (-R + A - A ) H
                                 f o r   t < T, 
                                                 
9
   The parameter m corresponds to the "D" in Ha-Duong et al. (1997), indicating the magnitude of inertia in the 
economy, i.e. the higher m, the higher the penalty to rapid change.   8
where τt, µt and λt are the shadow values of St, Ht and Rt respectively. Following GM a negative 
τt is used, departing from the usual setup in the control literature, to clarify the positive shadow 
value (i.e. the marginal benefit) of abatement and the negative impact of additional (baseline) 
emissions. 
 
For  t  ≥ T , the concentration constraint must be satisfied, hence it is necessary to form the 
Lagrangian 
    tt t t =+ η (S-S ) LH . 
Assuming an interior solution, and therefore ruling out negative abatement, together with costate 
equations, state equations and transversality conditions, a set of first-order conditions (FOCs) can 
be derived from the maximum principle. Since the negative of (1) and (3) as well as (4) are 
concave in A, R and H, the FOCs are also sufficient (Kamien and Schwartz, 1991, Part II, 
Section 3). The relevant necessary conditions that provide insights with respect to the optimal 
abatement path are 
    tt
A tt + 1
tt - 1 t+1






       (FOC  1) 
    tt
tt t t
tt - 1 t+1






    (FOC  2) 
  and                    0, for t < T 
    t
t
t






- -       ( F O C   3 )   t
        ηt, for t ≥ T. 
 
For the sake of completeness we also state the remaining FOCs, which are 
 
    tt t t t
t
tt - 1 I t+1







=      (FOC  4) 
 and 
    tt
tt t t H
tt - 1 t+1






.   (FOC  5) 
 
(FOC 1) states that in each period optimality requires the sum of the marginal costs of abatement 
and the value of a change in current abatement evaluated in the next period λt+1 less the current 
value of a change in abatement λt to be equal to the shadow-costs of CO2-emissions τt.   9
 
(FOC 2) shows that λt is not necessarily strictly increasing or strictly decreasing over the whole 
time horizon, but depends on Rt. However, an acceleration of abatement activities implies an 
increase of the multiplier due to increasing marginal transition costs. 
 
To achieve a more intuitive expression of (FOC 1), a first step is solving the differential equation 
in (FOC 2) with respect to t, which gives 
    -(1+r)(s-t)
ts
t
λ =-2m R e ds
∞
∫ .                     (8) 
Using (8) for λt and λt+1 in (FOC 1) leads to 
    -(1+r)(s-t) -(1+r)(s-t-1)
A ss
tt + 1




∫∫ t C . 
Now, for incremental time steps the difference in parentheses can be simplified to get 
    1+r -(1+r)(s-t) 1+r
A s
t




∫ t t C+ .               (FOC 1’) 
GM define τt as the optimal carbon tax in a decentralized competitive economy, where no other 
market failures exist, thus being a pure Pigouvian tax that corrects the global externality 
associated with CO2-emissions. In this model, the optimal tax must equal the sum of direct 
marginal costs of abatement and marginal costs of the difference between current and next 
periods discounted sum of the rates of abatement. The explanation for this is that e.g. if 
abatement rises over time, an addition in current abatement increases the current rate (and 
therefore current costs of change) but reduces the rate in the next period. We will refer to the net 
effect as the costs of abatement shifting. 
2.2.2.  Implications of ITC and inertia 
The focus of this section is to analyze whether there are some indications for opposite effects of 
ITC and inertia on the optimal abatement path and particularly on initial abatement. Optimality 
requires that the FOCs are fulfilled at every point in time. Therefore, to first answer the question 
how the optimal abatement path reacts to the introduction of transition costs, (FOC 1’) is 
differentiated with respect to m and evaluated at m = 0, which gives 
    1+r -(1+r)(s-t) 1+r tt
AA AH s t
t
dA dH dτ






t C+ ,   10
solving for dAt/dm leads to 
   













.           (9) 
The impact of m on At turns out to be ambiguous for t > 0, as can be seen from (9). The 
denominator is positive (marginal abatement costs by assumption increase at an increasing rate) 
and dτt/dm is clearly non-negative, because switching from m = 0 to m > 0 imposes an additional 
cost to abatement and therefore increases the shadow-costs of emissions. Nothing can be said 
about how m changes the optimal value of Ht and additionally, the sign of the third term in the 
numerator, defining the change in the costs of abatement shifting, is ambiguous. Matters change 
if the analysis is restricted to the initial period. Evaluating (9) at t = 0 and using the assumption 
that R0 = 0 and H0 is fixed, results in 














.               (10) 
A0 tends upward, because the shadow-costs of carbon emissions increase with the level of inertia 
as stated above. In the initial period, the sign of the change in the costs of abatement shifting can 
be derived. The integral is non-negative, because from abatement being non-negative follows 
that the sum of all possible decreases in abatement cannot exceed the sum of all increases and 
furthermore the increases must happen before the decreases and are therefore discounted less.
10 
Altogether, the change in the costs of abatement shifting is negative. The intuition behind is that 
if the penalty to change is increased, then the optimal abatement path will be characterized by 
lower changes. Now, the negative sign leads to an overall positive numerator. So we can 
conclude that introducing costs of change put an upward pressure on initial abatement. 
Therefore, the above representation of the impacts of inertia can be seen as an analytical 
underpinning of Ha-Duong et al.’s (1997) or Grubb’s (1997) numerical analyses that higher 
                                                 
10  This argumentation denies the possibility of an extremely sharp increase in abatement in the first period that is not 
realized in the objective function due to the starting point problem. But several simulations even with 
unrealistically high costs of change did not show a tendency for such behavior. The reason is presumably the 
continuous increase in baseline emissions during the early periods and that there is no option to "over abate" at 
early periods to lower future baseline emissions.   11
inertia shifts optimal early abatement upward. From here on the term “inertia-effect” is used to 
refer to this tendency.
11 
 
To shed some light on the impacts of ITC in the presence of inertia (FOC 1’) is now 
differentiated with respect to k, which gives 
1+r -(1+r)(s-t) tt s t - 1 s t - 2
AA AH
t-1 t-2 t
dA dH dR dA dR dA
C+ C + 2 m ( 1 - e ) + e
dk dk dA dk dA dk
∞  
    
∫ d s  
1+r tt - 1 tt - 2
t-1 t-2
dR dA dR dA dτ
+e + =
dA dk dA dk dk
 
    
t .         (11) 
Unfortunately, (11) hardly provides any insights concerning dAt/dk, as long as there are terms 
containing  dAt−1/dk and dAt−2/dk. To circumvent this problem it is necessary to consider 
infinitesimally small time steps, such that successive changes in abatement through ITC are 
basically identical, i.e. it can be assumed that 
    t-2 t-1 t dA dA dA
dk dk dk
≈≈ . 
This assumption might look strong at first glance but it really does not postulate anything else 
but a relative robustness in the sense of similar behavior of an extremely small region of the 
optimal path (from t-2 to t) towards an incremental change in k. Applying this, (11) can be 
solved for dAt/dk, which gives 




1+r -(1+r)(s-t) 1+r ss tt
AA
t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t
dτ dH
-C dA dk dk
dk dR dR dR dR
C+ 2 m ( 1 - e ) + e d s + e +
dA dA dA dA
∞ ≈
  
      
∫
.     (12) 
For sufficiently small time steps, the integral in the denominator of (12) can be approximated as 
a sum and at time t the term in large parentheses can be written as 
    1+r -(1+r) 1+r tt t + 1 tt
t-1 t-2 t-1 t-1 t-2
dR dR dR dR dR
-e ) + + e +e +








                                                
which uses the fact that (2) implies Rt = At−1 − A t−2, such that dRs/dAt = 0 for s − t > 2. 
Furthermore,  dRt/dAt−1 = 1 and dRt/dAt−2 = dRt+1/dAt−1 = −1 so that the above expression 
simplifies to 
 
11  It seems necessary to point out that the analytical result is only valid in the vicinity of m = 0, but simulations do 
not provide any indication not to believe that it holds also around other values of m.   12
( ) ()
1+r -(1+r) 1+r 1+r -(1+r) -(1+r) (1-e ) 1-1-e +e 1-1 =(1-e )(-e )=1-e >0  for t > 1. 
Assumptions (5a and b) imply that dRt/dAt−2 = 0 for t = 1, such that at t = 1 the second last 
expression reduces to 2−e
− (1+r) > 0. Consequently, for t = 0, also dRt/dAt−1 = 0, and the whole 
expression becomes zero. Defining the second term in the denominator of (12) as a function f(r, 
t) the equation can be rewritten as 






-C dA dk dk
dk C +2mf(r,t)
≈ ,                  (12’) 
     0, for t = 0  
   w i t h   f(r, t) =   2−e
− (1+r), for t = 1 
     1−e
− (1+r), for t > 1. 
The starting point problem, which is inherent in the delayed response setup, introduces some 
weird behavior of the function f(r, t) during the first two periods. But from the analytical 
perspective the only relevant aspect is that f(r, t) is clearly non-negative, because compared to 
the GM result, which can be recovered for m = 0, the only difference is the magnitude but not the 
sign of the denominator. Since CAA is positive the denominator in total is positive. Thus, the 
direction of dAt/dk depends only on the numerator. To start with, the second term (−CAH) is 
positive, because by assumption knowledge decreases marginal abatement. Together with the 
fact that H increases with k we end up with a positive impact on current abatement. But on the 
other hand the first term of the numerator (dτt/dk) is what GM call the “shadow-cost-effect”. In 
their model, it turns out to be less than or equal to zero for every point in time. An intuitive 
explanation for dτt/dk ≤ 0 is according to GM that ITC provides an instrument to lower future 
abatement costs, such that additional emissions become less frightening, which reduces their 
shadow-costs. GM also demonstrate analytically that dτt/dk cannot be positive. It can be easily 
shown that their proof is valid also in this context.
12 Consequently, for any point in time there is 
a trade off between the shadow-cost-effect and the "knowledge-growth-effect” (−CAHdHt/dk), 
therefore the impact of k on At is ambiguous. But something can be said about the change of 
initial abatement A0. As H0 is fixed, evaluating (12’) at t = 0, such that dH0/dk = 0, gives 
                                                 
12  The analytical proof shows that the assumption of dτt/dk > 0 leads to a contradiction. It basically requires the right 
hand side of (12’) to be strictly positive for dτt/dk > 0, which is the case here. For the detailed proof see GM’s 
Appendix A.   13







,                       (13) 
which is the same expression as in GM, indicating that initial abatement changes in the same 
direction as the initial shadow-cost.
13 As stated above the shadow-cost-effect is less than or equal 
to zero, implying a negative impact of ITC on initial abatement (this could be called “R&D-
effect” in opposite to the upward inertia-effect). 
 
From (13) it is tempting to conclude that the change in initial abatement is independent of change 
costs. But the shadow-costs τ increase with additional costs of transition. Thus, in this model ITC 
affects initial shadow-costs at a higher level and it is reasonable to think that the magnitude of 
the change in shadow-costs due to ITC declines if m increases, i.e. the larger the share of 
transition costs. However, it can be noted that the basic mechanisms of the GM model with 
respect to ITC through R&D are still at work. Initial abatement weakly goes down, implying 
some deferral of abatement. But in general, as can be seen from (12’), the impact of ITC on the 
optimal abatement path is decreasing in m. The reason is straightforward: A large share of 
change costs within the total costs makes the optimal path to get close to the smoothest path that 
satisfies the constraints. Thus, the larger m, the more expensive it is to move away from the 
smoothest path by taking advantage of the ITC option. Nevertheless, even for extremely high 
values of m there will be some downward pressure on initial abatement by “turning on ITC” 
through increasing k, all else being equal. On the other hand, as shown above, m has (ceteris 
paribus) an opposite inertia-effect. Analytically there is no way to gain any information about the 
relative magnitude of the two impacts, but as the simulations will show, it appears that for 
reasonable parameters, the upward inertia-effect tends to outweigh the downward R&D-effect. 
2.3.  Technological change through LBD 
In this section the above model will be altered, such that technological change does not depend 
on expenditures on R&D anymore, but rather “comes for free” just by learning from the act of 
abatement. So in this case, the social planner only chooses an optimal abatement path, but she is 
well aware of the fact that early abatement lowers the costs of later abatement by accumulating 
                                                 
13
  The effect on initial abatement defined by (13) is not an approximation anymore, because it can directly be 
derived from (11) assuming dAt−1 and dAt−2 to be zero, as they are not defined for t = 0.   14
knowledge. At this point, for simplicity the function of change costs is already specified 
according to equation (7) and the planner solves 












   s . t .   R=  for t ≥ 1                 (15)  tt t t - R+ A-A 
                        (16) 
0
tt t S= - δS+ E -A 
                      (17)  tt t H= αH+ k Ψ(A ,H ) 
     0 R =0                   (18a) 
     0 R =0                     (18b) 
    H0, S0 given, and  t SS ≤  for t ≥ T.               (19) 
The definitions of the variables and parameters are exactly as in the R&D model. Besides the 
fact that investment costs drop out of the objective function, only (4) changes, since now it is 
abatement itself that increases knowledge accumulation (ΨA > 0,  ΨAA < 0).
14 Solving the 
problem involves the same assumptions about the existence of an interior solution and necessary 
first order conditions. For the sake of brevity a renewed statement of the Hamiltonian is forgone 
and it turns out that all (relevant) FOCs derived in Section 2.2 are the same with the exception of 
(FOC 1’), which now is 
    1+r -(1+r)(s-t) 1+r
A tA s t
t




∫ .   (FOC  6) 
Compared to the FOC in the R&D case, here the shadow-value of abatement is equal to the 
marginal costs of abatement and change of abatement, reduced by the value of learning from 
abating. 
 
To proceed as in the R&D specification, the impact of a change in m is explored by 
differentiating (FOC 6) with respect to m and evaluating it at m = 0, which gives 
                                                 
14  The assumption of decreasing returns of learning is motivated by the empirical observation of experience curves. 
See e.g. Dutton and Thomas (1984), Argote and Epple (1990) or Wene (2000) in the context of carbon-free 
energy sources.   15
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∫ t +2 .         (20) 
The above expression contains several terms that are difficult if not impossible to sign. To 
illuminate matters a little bit, considering (20) at t = 0 makes the second and fourth term of the 
left hand side become zero, since H0 is fixed. Taking the fifth term as given for the moment and 
solving for dA0/dm leads to 
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.             (21) 
First of all it can be noted that without ITC, i.e. k = 0, expression (21) reduces to expression (10) 
of the R&D case and A0 tends upward if m increases. But if k > 0, things get unclear. Since 
knowledge lowers abatement costs, the shadow value of knowledge µ0 cannot be negative. Thus, 
by assuming decreasing returns in knowledge accumulation, the second term in the denominator 
is negative, so that the sign of the ratio is already ambiguous. Furthermore, it turns out to be 




Hence, there is no definite answer to the question whether in an ITC world initial abatement 
tends upward or downward if the inertia of the system increases.
16 This might be a surprising 
result at first glance. Optimal initial abatement tends upward in the R&D specification; so one 
might expect such a consequence all the more if it is possible to gain learning effects from early 
abatement. But there is uncertainty about the impact of LBD itself as it is shown now. Following 
the same steps as in the R&D case, the derivative of (FOC 6) with respect to k is taken, but this 
time evaluated at k = 0. Furthermore, the same assumptions about the impact of a change of k on 
neighboring values of abatement is used to derive an approximation of the effect as 
                                                 
H
15   A derivation of the sign of the third term in the numerator would require for a start an integration of the costate 
equation of µt, which is ttt t H t µ =r µ - H/ H =( r-α-kΨ )µ +C ∂∂  . But the integration fails, since ΨH is not 
necessarily constant over time and multiplicatively connected with µt. 
16
   The simulations will show that within reasonable ranges of parameters (which imply an upward sloping 
abatement path at least over the 21st century) increased inertia shifts optimal initial abatement up to ensure a 
smoother path during the early periods.   16
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≈ ,                 (22) 
     0, for t = 0   
   w i t h   f(r, t) =   2−e
− (1+r), for t = 1 
     1−e
− (1+r), for t > 1. 
Compared to the R&D specification, there is an additional term in the numerator, which GM call 
the “LBD-effect”. It is the value of a marginal change in knowledge due to a change in 
abatement. Together with the knowledge-growth effect there is a tendency for abatement to be 
increased by the introduction of ITC. On the other hand, there is still a negative shadow-cost-
effect working in the opposite direction, justifying postponement of abatement, since it gets 
cheaper over time by accumulating knowledge.
17 Unlike the R&D case opposite effects remain 
even in the initial period, because at t = 0 equation (22) reduces to 






+µ Ψ dA dk =
dk C
,                     (23) 
which is the same expression as in GM. The LBD-effect in (23) rules out that initial abatement 
necessarily declines. Actually, this effect is responsible for the increase in virtually all of GM’s 
numerical simulations. In the existence of the LBD-effect, GM see weak support for Ha-Duong 
et al.’s (1997) claim that besides inertia, LBD would be an additional justification for higher 
initial abatement.
18 But in this model, there is an inertia-effect at work that has an ambiguous 
impact on initial abatement. The numerical simulations will show that there is a strong upward 
inertia-effect that gives very little room to additional cost-effective increases through LBD. 
2.4.  Summary of analytical results 
To sum up the key results of the section, Table 1 provides an overview over the main impacts 
(ceteris paribus) of inertia and ITC on optimal initial abatement. In the R&D specification, the 
GM model turns out to be robust in the sense that the qualitative results are unchanged, even 
though the formulation of inertia allows for a wide range of different assumptions about the 
behavior of abatement costs. On the other hand, in the LBD case, an ambiguous result is now 
perturbed with additional uncertainty. It is of course not a particularly surprising outcome that by 
                                                 
17   As in the R&D case GM’s analytical proof of the shadow-cost-effect being weakly negative is valid also in this 
enhanced setting. 
18  Note that Rasmussen (2001) is an example where the shadow-cost effect outweighs the LBD-effect.   17
increasing the complexity of the model an already indistinct result becomes even more uncertain, 
but it could have created a situation in which additional forces work in the same direction as the 
LBD-effect. 
3.  Functional forms and parameterization 
To get an impression of the relative magnitudes of the different effects on an optimal abatement 
path derived in the previous section and the corresponding costs, numerical simulations are 
performed. The functional forms and main parameter values with respect to direct abatement 
costs, knowledge accumulation and CO2 accumulation chosen for the simulations follow GM 
directly to ensure that the results are comparable at least with respect to the order of magnitude. 






α α tot 0 A R t
tt tt c t α 0
t tt
A 1
C ( A , H, E,  R) = C() + C() = M + m R
H (E - A )
⋅⋅ .         (24) 
The functional form of the direct abatement costs C
A(·) satisfies all the assumptions of the 
analytical section. Furthermore, costs tend to infinity if there is complete abatement of all 
emissions.
19 This specification is reasonable in the sense that the model considers virtually all 
anthropogenic CO2-emissions and therefore does not allow for a backstop technology, which 
could serve as a substitute in all cases 
 
GM set αc1 = 3, αc1 = 2, and Mc = 83, such that costs of reducing emissions by 25% in 2020 
should fall in the range between 0.5% and 4% of global GDP. Moreover, using a 5% discount 
rate, the net present value of all abatement costs for reaching a 550 ppmv stabilization by 2200 
should be some $600 billion. Since GM only provide a rough scheme of their baseline emission 
path it was impossible to reproduce these values exactly. However, the optimal abatement paths 
generated with this model are sufficiently close to their ones, such that the above parameter 
values are applied as a reference point. Baseline emissions follow IPCC IS92a (Leggett et al., 
                                                 
19  To avoid possible divisions by zero during the optimization process, the programs include an additional condition 
that forces At to be strictly less than  .  0
t E  18
1992) until 2110, peaking slightly above 26 GtC at that time. Afterwards, baseline emissions 
decline so as to stabilize at roughly 18 GtC around 2200.
20 
 
Now, costs of change C
R(·) enter the numerical model basically in the same way as in the 
analytical part except that  tt t - 1 R =A-A  is used, which implies  tt t + 1 t R =- R+A -A  . This has 
previously been avoided to achieve an analytically more convenient lag-structure instead of a 
lead-structure. Numerically this is irrelevant and has the advantage of gaining one more 
observation in the very beginning, which is of particular interest. The exponents αc3 and αc4 in 
equation (24) are set equal to 2 in the central case.
21 This formulation of change costs follows 
Ha-Duong et al. (1997), who claim that results from several modeling studies of capital stock 
turnover justify a nonlinear increase in costs. They interpret m as the characteristic timescale of 
turnover in the global energy system. From the half-life of capital for a depreciation rate of 4% 
they derive m = 20 ≈ ln2/0.04 years as a lower bound for inertia, representing a realistic 
assumption for the average rate of replacement of appliances and cars. To incorporate typical 
timescales of the turnover in energy systems and additional sources of inertia, Ha-Duong et al. 
(1997) also analyze a value of m = 50. In order not to overstate the impact of inertia, in this 
model a rather low end value of 30 is used for the central case. 
 
Splitting up abatement costs into direct and change costs requires a recalibration. Therefore, the 
parameter Mc of equation (24) is altered, such that the sum of total discounted costs (without 
ITC) including costs of change equals the sum in the GM central case. A reduction from 83 to 74 
fulfils this requirement. Additionally, with m = 30 the share of the sum of discounted transition 
costs within total costs over the next century is approximately 33%. For m = 20 and m = 50 the 
according percentages are 18% and 55% respectively, which are lower but basically in line with 
the values of Ha-Duong et al. (1997), who report 31% and 71%. 
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max = 26.3 GtC and E
min = 18 GtC. 
21   For the sake of simplicity, m is used instead of m
2 in the analytical part. Furthermore, in the simulations, the 
employment of the absolute value of Rt makes it possible to do sensitivity analyses with respect to the exponent 
αc4.   19
Turning to the equations defining technological change, knowledge accumulates autonomously 
at a rate α = 0.005. Furthermore, the returns from ITC in the R&D case raise knowledge 
according to 
   Ψ ,                (25a) 
γφ
tt Ψ tt (I ,H )= M I H
with MΨ = 0.0022 and γ = φ = 0.5. This is a standard knowledge production function, which is 
widely used in the endogenous technological change literature.
22 It employs constant returns to 
scale and implies that knowledge generation is characterized by “standing on shoulders”, but 
with decreasing returns. GM calibrate MΨ, such that direct abatement costs decline by some 30% 
in their R&D case. The price of investments into R&D is assumed to be p(It) = It, thus, via 
expression (1) costs of R&D increase squared. This represents the idea that there is only a 
limited pool of (potential) researchers and they must be drawn away from other sectors at 
increasing costs, i.e. there is a crowding out in the sense of Goulder and Schneider (1999) and 
Popp (2004). To use a consistent approach in the LBD specification knowledge increases by 
   Ψ                 (25b) 
γφ
tt Ψ tt (A ,H )= M A H
with the same parameter values as before, such that there are decreasing returns in learning, 
mimicking the behavior of experience curves.
23 
 
Finally, we follow GM in using a slightly more realistic formulation of the accumulation of CO2 
in the atmosphere than the one used in the analytical section that goes back to Nordhaus (1994, 
chapter 3): 
    ,                  (26) 
0
tt tt S = (E - A )- (S - PIL) βδ &
where β is set to be 0.64 meaning that only 64% of anthropogenic emissions actually contribute 
to the atmospheric CO2-concentration and on the other hand, a natural rate of carbon uptake δ, 
which equals 0.008 (per annum), only reduces concentration levels above the preindustrial 
concentration (PIL) of 278 ppmv. The concentration level of 2000 as a starting point is assumed 
to be 360 ppmv. 
 
                                                 
22   A similar function is used by Nordhaus (2002) and goes back to Romer (1990), whose original specification 
would appear for φ = 0. 
23  Grubb et al. (2002) criticize the use of such a knowledge production function for modeling LBD as it would imply 
– as they incorrectly claim – that 50% of the LBD gained in one period dissipates exponentially in each 
subsequent period and hence understates LBD potentials.   20
In the central cases stabilization targets of 550 ppmv will be analyzed, which are to be achieved 
by 2200. The 550 ppmv level received great attention in the literature and therefore ensures 
comparability of results. It simply refers to a rough doubling of preindustrial concentration; 
hence it contains no further scientific foundation of being a “safe” target. The model is solved in 
five-year steps from 2000 until 2300. In the last period, steady state conditions require abatement 
and CO2-concentrations to remain constant, to eliminate any unsmooth behavior at the very end. 
The model runs on GAMS 21.1 using the CONOPT3 solver.
24 Usual computational difficulties 
related to the path dependence of LBD that potentially runs solvers into local optima are 
negligible here, since only one path is chosen optimally in opposite to models of competing 
technologies.
25  
4.  Results of numerical simulations 
In this section the main results from a wide range of simulations are presented in the following 
way. Firstly, the behavior of the optimal abatement path in the presence of inertia but without 
ITC is presented for the central case parameter values stated in the previous section. Afterwards 
the timing of optimal abatement in the R&D and LBD modifications is presented, before changes 
of overall costs of stabilization and optimal CO2-taxes are shown. 
 
Most of the results gain their significance from a comparison with the GM study. Thus, it is 
necessary to redo their simulations under the baseline emission path constructed for this model.
26 
It turns out that the model reproduces all their results adequately, also with respect to the 
responsiveness to certain parameter changes, but the impact of ITC is slightly lower within all 
model runs. This seems to be acceptable, because the difference is well within the same order of 
magnitude and the model including inertia is calibrated against the redone simulations. 
 
Nevertheless, one important drawback of this study needs to be pointed out. In both ITC 
specifications (R&D and LBD) there are four cases to be considered: With or without ITC and 
low inertia as well as with or without ITC and high inertia. So there is no real ceteris paribus 
situation. As already indicated above, the results in Sections 4.2 to 4.4 are presented in contrast 
                                                 
24  The GAMS code is available from the authors upon request. 
25  For a discussion of the reliability of different solvers in the context of LBD in energy technologies see Manne and 
Barreto (2004). 
26  The simulations are done using Mc = 83 as described in Section 3.   21
to the GM situation to overcome this problem. This strategy can be defended by the fact that the 
two base cases, i.e. the model in the GM parameterization (Mc = 83) and in the inertia 
parameterization (Mc = 74 and m = 30) each without ITC (k = 0), have by calibration the same 
NPV of total abatement. Furthermore, costs of change account for 33% of the total costs from 
2000-2100, but are responsible for only some 10% of the total costs over the whole simulated 
time span. Additionally, it can be seen from Figure 2 that the two cases also hardly differ in the 
overall behavior of the optimal abatement path. So it can be concluded that the two cases are 
sufficiently comparable. 
4.1.  Optimal abatement-paths in the presence of inertia 
As mentioned right before Figure 2 shows the similarity of the two base cases on a large time 
scale. Abatement is accelerating until the beginning of the next century and slowly increases for 
another 50 years before it turns down. Baseline emissions are already falling from 2115 but 
abatement remains relatively high such as to meet the concentration target by 2200. At the year 
2200 the optimal path kinks down, because baseline emissions are low and the concentration 
level can be maintained with relatively low abatement efforts compared to the high levels that 
were necessary to reduce CO2- concentrations in order to meet the target. 
 
To get an impression of how the optimal abatement path reacts towards changes in the assumed 
sluggishness of the systems, Figure 3 shows the range of several additional model runs, within 
the lower (m = 20) and the upper end (m = 50) of the Ha-Duong et al. (1997) parameters. Only 
the first one hundred years, which are the relevant ones from the policy point of view, are shown. 
Figure 3 underlines one of the main findings of the analytical part, namely the upward pressure 
of inertia on initial abatement. On the other hand, the graphs prove the intuitive reasoning that 
higher costs of change would lead to a more smooth abatement path and therefore require higher 
initial abatement, to be only part of the story. Instead, an important rationale lies in the forces of 
discounting, which do affect costs of change in the same way as direct abatement costs. Looking 
at the graph for m = 50 it is clearly optimal to have a fairly flat path as long as possible and 
realize high transition costs from acceleration not before the second half of the century. 
 
The high inertia case implies significantly more early abatement than the low one (about 0.3 
GtC), but the picture changes, such that around 2075 some 0.5 GtC less must be abated. Part of 
this effect is due to the setup of the model, which incorporates the implicit assumption that the   22
choice of the initial level of abatement is free of transition costs. Therefore, the model tends to 
overstate optimal initial abatement. But additional model runs with zero discounting show that 
due to the fact that baseline emissions are mainly increasing, the former argument of a smoother 
path towards the stabilization target that requires higher initial abatement is valid. This cause for 
an upward shift would be less dependent of assumptions regarding transition costs towards the 
initial period. However, it should be noted that we are not aiming at a precise estimate of initial 
abatement, but rather investigate how different assumptions about the inertia of the system 
change the reaction of optimal early abatement towards technological change. 
4.2.  Optimal timing in the presence of R&D 
4.2.1. Central  case 
In this section the focus is on how an optimal path characterized by inertia is altered if 
technological change can be induced via R&D. Therefore, in the two base cases, the parameter k 
is switched from zero to one. Recall from the analytical analysis that early abatement is expected 
to go down, independent of any assumptions about the underlying inertia of the system (R&D-
effect). Figure 4 shows the optimal abatement paths of the two base cases each with and without 
R&D. The optimal paths without R&D are very similarly affected by introducing R&D. Due to 
the shadow-cost-effect, optimal abatement is reduced in the first decade and actually over the 
whole 21st century - slightly in the beginning but more pronounced in the last 25 years. Looking 
at the first two decades it becomes obvious that at least during that period the main determination 
of each path lies in the assumed inertia and is not much altered by introducing R&D. 
4.2.2.  Sensitivity of the impact of R&D on initial abatement 
An extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the assumed inertia of the system also for 
extreme values of m has been done to underpin especially the results presented in Figure 3 and 
Figure 4. Not surprisingly, given the analytically derived insights, initial abatement always 
increases with m and decreases if the R&D situation is compared with the non-R&D situation. 
For the sake of brevity, these rather tedious results are not presented in detail. In contrast, the 
following question is more broadly examined: What if the GM model is “true” apart from a 
single parameter that has to be adjusted and how much would be the impact of R&D under these 
circumstances? This is compared with the assumption that the inertia model is the correct one 
aside from a certain parameter. Figure 5 shows the percentage reduction of initial abatement due   23
to R&D under different assumptions about the discount rate r, the stabilization target S (formerly 
denoted as S ) and parameters guiding the evolution of knowledge over time, namely the relative 
magnitude of ITC (MΨ), stronger benefits from previous knowledge (φ = 0.75) or oppositely 
“fishing out” (φ = -0.5), higher autonomous technological change (α = 0.01), and finally no 
autonomous technological change at all (α = 0). By comparing the two central cases it can be 
seen that the reduction is cut by half in the inertia-model compared to the GM model. Similar 
drastic declines in the impact of R&D are observable for alterations  in the knowledge 
parameters. Reductions in the effect of R&D are still noticeable for different values of the 
discount rate and the stabilization target, with the extremely ambitious S = 350 ppmv target 
being the only exception, in which R&D remains powerful. 
 
Looking at the bars, it is tempting to conclude that the downshifting R&D-effect on initial 
abatement in the presence of inertia is severely limited. But this view neglects the fact that in the 
model ITC only affects the direct abatement costs. Figure 6 outlines the share of transition costs 
within total costs during the 21st century. By calibration, they amount for some 33% in the 
central case and therefore also in the simulations where only MΨ or φ are altered. The 
contribution of costs of change to total costs increases with the discount rate, because higher 
discounting implies later abatement and hence requires fast transition at some point in time. The 
same argument is valid for a higher stabilization target.
27 Taking Figure 5 and Figure 6 together 
it becomes obvious that the main reason for the lower impact of ITC on initial abatement lies in 
the fact that a smaller fraction of costs is affected by ITC. Within this smaller fraction, the R&D-
effect is quite noticeably. Nevertheless, as one would have expected from the analytical part, 
R&D and inertia seem to interfere with each other. From the S = 350 case follows that a low 
share of transition costs gives room for an R&D-effect in the “usual” magnitude. But looking at 
the extreme differences in the shares of transition costs between S = 450 and S = 650 as well as 
between r = 0.025 and r = 0.075 it is at least remarkable to see rather similar reductions of the 
R&D-effect. However, it cannot be ruled out that it is mainly due to the parameterization. 
 
                                                 
27   In both cases also costs of change are deferred into the future. However, looking at the data underlying Figure 5 
indicates that the share of change costs within total costs increases due to a stronger decline in direct costs. The 
opposite holds true for lower discounting or a lower stabilization target.   24
To complete the picture about what’s going on in the initial period, Figure 7 gives an impression 
of the absolute values.
28 Independent of the parameters chosen (with the S = 350 case being 
somewhat aside), initial abatement much more depends on the question whether the “true” model 
is characterized by inertia or not rather than the presence of R&D. Therefore with respect to the 
optimal timing of abatement efforts, inertia seems to be crucial. We can sum up the main results 
of this section as follows: If the inertia model is believed to describe the reality more adequately, 
optimal initial abatement is comparatively high but remains on this level relatively long, before it 
accelerates significantly, at even higher rates as without inertia. It is primarily the assumed 
magnitude of inertia in the system that determines the optimal timing in the near future. 
However, ITC still has a noticeable effect on initial abatement, which can be seen as support for 
GM’s results. 
4.3.  Optimal timing with LBD 
4.3.1. Central  case 
Over the whole simulated time scale the optimal abatement path in the presence of LBD follows 
roughly the picture in Figure 2. However, there are some remarkable differences in near term 
behavior. Figure 8 shows the optimal abatement paths of the two central cases with and without 
LBD. The solid lines indicate that LBD increases initial abatement in the GM model, i.e. the 
LBD-effect outweighs the shadow-cost-effect before by 2030 long-term gains from enhanced 
learning are exploited and the difference turns negative. But in the inertia model things are quite 
different. Initially, abatement is at a higher level due to inertia, but it is virtually unaffected by 
LBD (the two graphs basically lie upon each other) until about 2025 where small reductions can 
be observed, which get more pronounced over time, implying a noticeable advantage for 
deferring action. Thus, like in the R&D specification it is the inert path that shows the fastest 
acceleration at the end of the century. However, the main conclusion to be drawn from Figure 8 
is that in the presence of inertia the LBD-effect and the shadow-cost-effect seem to balance each 
other. In the numerical part of GM's study initial abatement goes significantly up under almost 
all different assumptions about parameter values. The results of the sensitivity analyses of the 
next section reveal that GM's outcomes do not generally resist the introduction of inertia. 
                                                 
28  Information about the initial period also implies similar optimal behavior in the following periods, since almost all 
model runs show very smooth behavior at the beginning. So it is not the aim to say that optimal abatement in the 
year 2000 should have been e.g. 0.5 GtC. It should rather be interpreted as "relatively high" or "relatively low" 
abatement within the next, say 20 years, because comparable figures could be drawn until 2020.   25
4.3.2.  Sensitivity of the impact of LBD on initial abatement 
To address the orders of magnitude of the change in initial abatement if knowledge accumulation 
is enhanced by LBD, the model is run with the same parameter changes as in the R&D sections. 
In the GM model, LBD increases initial abatement noticeably except for S = 350 and S = 450. 
But in the presence of inertia it remains almost unchanged and for r = 0.025, MΨ = 0.0044, and α 
= 0 actually the sign of the impact switches, and LBD lowers initial abatement. Figure 9 also 
shows the change of initial abatement under different assumptions for the exponent of the rate of 
change (αc4) and for the characteristic timescale of the energy system (m).
29 Decreasing the 
exponent implies that small rates are relatively expensive and vice versa. Therefore, Figure 9 
illustrates that the more costly changes are, the lower the impact of LBD, which can be even 
negative. 
 
Recall from the discussion of the analytical analysis that already GM could not rule out a 
negative impact of LBD. But in their sensitivity analysis, the S = 350 ppmv case is the only one 
for which they report a negative impact of LBD. In the redone analysis here a decrease by 7.49% 
matches quite well with the 8.88% computed by them. GM state that numerically the positive 
LBD-effect can be quite substantial. Thus, the S = 350 ppmv case looks like an “outlier” for a 
rather unrealistic scenario, especially as they do not provide a result for the much more 
reasonable 450 ppmv case, which already shows the same tendency.
30 However, the main 
question is why inertia almost eliminates the generally substantial positive effect on initial 
abatement, since this is not at all a particularly intuitive result given e.g. Ha-Duong et al.’s 
(1997) claim that within their analysis of inertia they have probably underestimated the value of 
early abatement because of neglecting the effects of LBD. As in the R&D case a point could be 
made about the fact that LBD primarily affects direct abatement costs and therefore the impact 
on initial abatement should be alleviated. But this would only explain a reduction of the effect 
and not necessarily a change in direction. A more relevant reason can be derived from Figure 10, 
which goes back to the absolute values for initial abatement.
31 As in the R&D simulations, the 
magnitude of early abatement is dominated by the assumptions with respect to the discount rate 
                                                 
29  Since the inertia model is calibrated for αc4 = 2 and m = 30 there are no corresponding cases of the GM model. 
30  Actually, further sensitivity analyses, which are not reported here, show that if a 450 ppmv target is to be achieved 
and we alter the other parameters in the same way, LBD has always a negetive impact on initial abatement in the 
presence of inertia. 
31  Like  in Figure 9 values for the GM specification for changes of αc4 and m are left out due to the lack of 
compareability.   26
and the stabilization target and also whether inertia is present or not. Inertia shifts initial 
abatement upwards. Comparing the absolute values in Figure 10 with the relative changes in 
Figure 9 it becomes obvious that LBD has a decreasing impact exactly in those cases where 
initial abatement is already rather high. Then, due to decreasing returns in knowledge 
accumulation, the gains from additional early abatement to induce long term cost reductions are 
low. But on the other hand, the option to defer some more abatement efforts to the future, when 
they will be much cheaper because of discounting and “free” knowledge enhancements from 
LBD, becomes much more valuable. Consequently, this latter cost shifting potential of LBD 
might outweigh the former cost reduction potential. 
 
To elaborate this reasoning further, looking at the different parameterizations of the knowledge 
accumulation function in Figure 9 illustrates that in the GM specification MΨ = 0.0044 implies a 
high cost reduction potential and initial abatement shifts strongly up, whereas for MΨ = 0.0011 
this potential is rather low and higher initial abatement does not pay off that much. But with the 
already high initial abatement in the inertia case, the option to lower future costs is already 
sufficiently exploited for MΨ = 0.0044, such that abatement goes down, while this is not yet the 
case for MΨ = 0.0011 leaving room for a slight increase. The fact that a higher exponent of 
knowledge φ = 0.75 makes additional abatement relatively less valuable compared to the central 
case leads to a comparatively small increase in initial abatement in the GM case. At the 
previously higher levels in the inertia case for φ = 0.75 additional abatement is even less 
valuable and the cost shifting potential can hardly offset the cost reduction potential, ending up 
with early abatement being almost unchanged. For φ = -0.5 the reasoning holds vice versa. 
 
Putting together the insights gained from modeling LBD in the presence of inertia we find that 
like in the R&D case costs of change do not necessarily lead to a smooth path and may rather 
imply noticeable acceleration of abatement efforts. Furthermore, if one considers the discount 
rate and the stabilization target as first order determinants of the optimal path, then inertia of the 
system seems to be of second order before finally LBD has a rather negligible impact. While in 
the R&D case this has just led to a decrease in magnitude of the effect on optimal near term 
abatement, the qualitative results in the LBD case are not clear-cut anymore. The numerical 
simulations imply that if it was believed that the inertia of the system justifies substantial near 
term abatement then LBD potentials should only very cautiously be used as arguments for even   27
higher efforts, because one might neglect the option to defer some abatement to the future where 
it would be cheaper by the very act of abating. 
4.4.  Reduction of stabilization costs and optimal CO2-tax 
This section explores the impact of ITC on the overall costs for achieving a stabilization of the 
atmospheric CO2-concentration. R&D can be considered as an option to lower future abatement 
costs, which implies greater flexibility with respect to optimal timing, so that R&D has a 
significant cost reducing effect. The values reported in Table 2 show that the R&D option can 
indeed be fairly valuable. Compared to the non-R&D costs of roughly $400 billion reductions of 
17% even within rather inert systems (m = 50 or αc4 = 1) are substantial. For those 
parameterizations, which allow comparisons with the GM cases, cost savings for reaching the 
stabilization target due to R&D seem to be hardly affected by inertia. The reduction in direct 
costs, i.e. abatement costs and investment in R&D are only slightly less than in the GM case. Of 
course, the change in total costs, which include transition costs, is further reduced, but within an 
order of magnitude equivalent to the share of transition costs within total costs over the whole 
time horizon, e.g. some 10% in the central case. Thus, the cost reducing effect of R&D seems to 
work as usual, so to say, but is limited to the fraction of direct costs. Given the results from 
Section 4.2 this can be seen as an indication that declines in costs are mostly due to the long-term 
decrease in unit costs and only to a lesser extend by the option to lower early abatement. 
 
Since with LBD cost reductions are for free
32 the decline in costs should be even more 
pronounced compared to the R&D specification. Table 2 shows that this is indeed the case. 
Reductions of one third for the central case result in total discounted costs of only $270 billion 
for stabilization, which is at the very low end of the range of most cost estimates. Nevertheless, 
recent studies like that by van der Zwaan and Gerlagh (2002) show similarly low costs. If large 
LBD potentials are assumed, even further cost reductions up to 50% are observable and savings 
are slightly less in the more inert cases. As in the R&D simulations, reductions are limited (by 
construction) to the fractions of direct abatement costs. Once again, the major cost decreasing 
                                                 
32   The reductions are free since total costs would go down even if the non-ITC path was not altered. A deviation 
from the non-ITC path only occurs to achieve additional gains from timing. An increase in early abatement efforts 
could be interpreted as optimal demonstration investments that pay off in the future whereas a decline just realizes 
cost savings from deferring abatement.   28
effect of ITC is related to lower future unit costs rather than timing and therefore works 
independently of the assumed inertia. 
 
It should be noted that cost savings potentials for more ambitious stabilization targets (S = 450 
and  S = 350) are substantial, especially since they are related to higher initial values. This 
observation differs from the outcome of the much more complex model of Manne and Richels 
(2004) who get similar reduction levels for 550 ppmv and above, but almost no decline in costs 
for lower targets. Their explanation is that for those targets the main part of the costs is 
associated with premature retirement of the energy capital stock.
33 In their model, the speed of 
transition is constrained to a maximum rate. Here, costs of change increase with the square of 
change but the rate is unbounded. This opens the option for much more flexibility with respect to 
timing and therefore significant cost reductions. Table 2 also gives the impression that cost 
savings due to LBD are rather independent of the assumed inertia of the system. This result is 
consistent with Rasmussen (2001) who observes that welfare effects are not significantly altered 
if costs of capital adjustment are changed.
34 
 
Finally, Table 2 illustrates the effect on costs in a more policy orientated way. An optimal CO2-
tax generated by the model (i.e. the shadow-cost of carbon) would start at some moderate $3.9 
per ton of carbon for the GM and inertia central cases, and would then increase exponentially,
35 
reach approximately $13 by 2025 and hit $100 around 2060. Since there are no market failures in 
the model (not even in the R&D sector), setting taxes along such an optimal path would generate 
an abatement behavior that follows the optimal abatement timing shown in Figure 2 (Schneider 
and Goulder, 1997).
36 If the agent(s) can also decide on investment in R&D to lower abatement 
costs, the CO2-tax would induce optimal investment decisions with respect to timing and 
magnitude. But the optimal tax to do so would be lower since the ITC option decreases the 
                                                 
33    A further explanation of the divergence of the results might be due to a different choice of the date of 
stabilization, which they unfortunately do not report. 
34
   Given the similarity of the findings with respect to costs it would be interesting to see whether Rasmussen's 
(2001) model could confirm the responsiveness of initial abatement with respect to turnover costs, given the fact 
that he also observes a slight decline in initial abatement due to LBD. 
35  The rate of increase is determined by the discount rate and the natural rate of carbon uptake, as implied by (FOC 
3). 
36   As stated earlier, the tax is purely Pigouvian, correcting the global externality associated with CO2-emissions. 
Goulder and Schneider (1999) analyze the impact of a carbon tax if the R&D investments of non-carbon based 
energy providers are distorted (because they ignore knowledge spillovers). Then the tax incentive to increase 
R&D involves additional benefits, reducing the overall stabilization costs. Thus, ignoring such market failure 
might understate the optimal tax path.   29
optimal initial tax. This shifts the whole tax path down, because (according to (FOC 3)) if the tax 
rises at a constant rate, then the percentage reduction is the same over the whole time horizon. 
Table 2 reveals these reductions, so e.g. in the GM central case with R&D the optimal tax at each 
point in time would be 26.1% less than the corresponding tax without (i.e. more than one Dollar 
less per ton of carbon). In almost all R&D and LBD cases these tax shifts are quite noticeable 
and it turns out that inertia does not alter the reductions significantly. Similarly to the argument 
regarding reductions in total costs the impact of ITC on optimal taxes is slightly limited by the 
fact that first and foremost direct costs can be changed by R&D or LBD. 
 
To sum up the main results of this section it can be said that GM’s findings with respect to the 
reduction of overall costs of achieving stabilization of the atmosphere and of the necessary CO2-
taxes that would lead to the optimal timing of abatement, turn out to be robust against the 
inclusion of inertia and remain within the same magnitude. The declines in total costs and CO2-
taxes are limited to the range of direct costs, though, but this is mainly due to the modeled 
independence of direct costs and transition costs. 
5.  Conclusion and discussion 
This paper develops a model that includes two factors previously identified as crucial for 
determining costs and timing of a transition to a less carbon intensive energy system: ITC and 
inertia. The model optimizes global emission abatement over the next three centuries, so that 
atmospheric CO2-concentrations stabilize by 2200. Technological change is either enhanced 
through R&D or via LBD. Inertia is modeled by penalizing fast increases in abatement efforts 
with additional costs. Analytical insights are obtained especially with respect to optimal initial 
abatement and numerical simulations are done mainly to evaluate the relative magnitudes of the 
opposite effects implied by ITC and inertia. The model confirms the widely accepted view that 
ITC reduces the costs of stabilizing the atmospheric CO2-concentration at any given level 
considerably. The inclusion of inertia lowers this effect only slightly. The benefits from ITC are 
mainly due to long term cost reductions per unit of abatement rather than a different timing of 
major emission reduction efforts. 
 
Nevertheless, for today's policy considerations, near term costs and therefore optimal near term 
abatement requirements are particularly important. The numerical model reveals that the level of   30
inertia assumed determines early abatement to a much higher degree than does ITC. In the 
central case considered, inertia implies relatively high abatement over the next decades. 
Although analytically R&D always reduces optimal initial abatement even in the presence of 
inertia, the numerical model shows that the option to do R&D and lower current abatement is 
limited, because at early stages the relatively high share of transition costs dominates optimal 
timing. 
 
In the case of LBD, the model challenges the notion that potential gains from learning justify 
pronounced early abatement. Two interrelated effects are responsible for the fact that the model 
shows even negative impacts for not at all unrealistic parameter values. As inertia already 
implies relatively high initial abatement, additional upward pressure from LBD is limited 
because of decreasing returns from learning. Therefore, if learning potentials are sufficiently 
exhausted, optimality calls for a deferral of some abatement efforts as future actions are less 
costly due to the very act of learning together with discounting. 
 
The model cannot be used for detailed policy considerations because of its high aggregation. 
However, the simplicity provides the insights into the different effects, particularly in the context 
of LBD. More complex models would disguise these effects, but they should at least show 
similar overall behavior with respect to parameter changes. Therefore, the results obtained in the 
present study can also be used for testing the plausibility of optimal solutions derived in 
disaggregated models. Furthermore, models showing an increase in optimal near term abatement 
due to LBD should be checked for their representation of inertia. 
 
There are several limitations of the present model. The empirical base for the parameters that 
describe the endogenous change of technology is weak. The stabilization target is assumed to be 
known, while uncertainty about the target is only addressed via sensitivity analysis. The 
implications of uncertainty in optimal timing of abatement are not clear-cut. There might be 
benefits from waiting given the sunk cost character of abatement (Pindyck, 2000, 2002), but 
there are also irreversibilities in the climate, calling for early action (Kolstad, 1996). 
 
Although the merits of the model lie in its simplicity, the high level of aggregation is another 
drawback. A promising compromise would be to break down the economy into two sectors, as in   31
Lecocq et al. (1998). The two sectors would differ in inertia, and therefore also in the effects of 
R&D and LBD. Additionally, knowledge spillovers between the two sectors could be 
incorporated. Similarly, instead of two sectors, two countries could be modeled, which have 
different starting positions for achieving a common emission reduction target. Since 
distributional effects are likely to have an important impact on climate targets and policies to 
achieve them, such a setting may provide valuable insights into burden sharing. Our model 
cannot address possible interactions between inertia and market imperfections, either in R&D or 
by LBD; for example, a slow turnover of the capital stock may limit demonstration effects of 
new technologies. We lump all inertia together, ignoring that there are different reasons why 
change is slow in the energy sector, and that this may affect the optimal emission reduction path. 
These issues are deferred to future research.   32
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Table 1 Analytical results 
 
 
  Higher Inertia (m↑)  Presence of ITC (k↑) 
R&D  A0 increases (inertia−effect)  A0 decreases (R&D−effect) 
LBD  A0 increases for k = 0 (inertia−effect), 
otherwise ambiguous effect on A0 

























































































































Low inertia (m = 20)
Central case (m = 30)
High inertia (m = 50)






























































































































































































































Figure 5 Change of optimal initial abatement through R&D  


















































































































































Figure 6 Sum of discounted costs of change during the first 100 years as percent of the sum 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9 Change of optimal initial abatement through LBD  
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Table 2 Reduction of stabilization costs and optimal CO2-tax  
 
   R&D LBD 
  
Discounted costs 
Non- R&D: ≈ $400 
 billion 
CO2-tax (τopt) 
Non-R&D: $3.8  
per ton of carbon
Discounted costs 
Non- LBD: ≈ $400 
billion 
CO2-tax (τopt) 
 Non-LBD: $3.8  









GM Inertia GM Inertia GM Inertia 
Central Case  -22.5% -21.8% -20.2% -26.1% -24.2% -35.0% -32.0% -36.5% -34.6% 
r = 0.075  -17.8% -17.0% -15.2% -20.3% -18.0% -30.7% -25.4% -31.9% -27.7% 
r = 0.025  -29.9% -29.2% -28.3% -34.7% -33.4% -39.8% -38.7% -41.3% -40.8% 
S = 650  -16.1% -15.3% -13.4% -19.1% -16.8% -31.6% -26.4% -33.6% -29.8% 
S = 450  -30.6% -29.8% -28.9% -34.4% -33.1% -37.4% -36.1% -38.1% -37.4% 
S = 350  -43.5% -42.7% -42.5% -47.8% -47.0% -37.8% -37.6% -37.5% -37.5% 
MΨ = 0.0044  -40.0% -38.9% -36.1% -44.5% -41.7% -53.4% -48.9% -55.0% -52.3% 
MΨ = 0.0011  -10.9% -10.5%  -9.7%  -13.0% -12.0% -20.7% -18.9% -21.7% -20.6% 
φ = 0.75  -26.4% -25.6% -23.8% -30.4% -28.3% -39.7% -36.3% -41.1% -39.1% 
φ = -0.5  -13.2% -12.7% -11.7% -15.6% -14.4% -22.8% -20.8% -24.2% -22.9% 
α = 0.01  -15.2% -14.6% -12.8% -18.1% -16.2% -28.9% -24.8% -30.4% -27.9% 
α = 0  -32.2% -31.4% -30.1% -36.1% -34.4% -41.9% -39.8% -43.1% -41.8% 
M = 50  - -21.4%  -18.3% - -22.7% - -28.5% - -32.1% 
M = 40  - -21.6%  -19.3% - -23.5% - -30.3% - -33.4% 
M = 20  - -21.9%  -21.1% - -24.8% - -33.5% - -35.6% 
αc4 = 3  - -21.9%  -21.6% - -25.2% - -32.8% - -36.1% 
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